

Was Alfred Thayer Mahan A Realist Or An Idealist?

Alfred Thayer Mahan is perhaps widely regarded as one of the fathers of modern naval strategy. He was one of the most influential U.S. political writers of the nineteenth century and his fundamental thesis, that a well financed and trained navy was essential to the success of a nation, held great sway with both Western and Japanese political establishments.¹ This has led to a categorisation of Mahan as a realist, a realist being one who recognises the fundamentally anarchical international system, one that is amoral and where state power and interest takes precedent.² This is an understandable conclusion considering Mahan's seminal work *The Influence Of Sea Power Upon History*, is a dense, detailed and methodical examination of European naval tactics and strategy over the course of a century.³ However, this is perhaps an unfair and simplistic interpretation of a man as complex as Mahan, to debase him and his intellectual work as purely cold, calculated and mechanistic.⁴

One of the continuing paradigms of U.S. foreign policy is realism versus idealism, idealism is customarily a term associated with U.S. President Woodrow Wilson in his ultimately futile desire to set up a form of global governance with the League of Nations. Idealism, the pursuit of an ideal in foreign policy, that aims to challenge the international anarchical system and achieve a set of goals beyond power politics, can however, be applied in a much broader sense beyond the traditional association with Wilsonian idealism. Niall Ferguson has made a case with Henry Kissinger, suggesting that he was ultimately an idealist driven by an ideology in the context of the Cold War, rather than the *realpolitik* as is traditionally assumed.⁵ Whatever is thought of the persuasiveness of this particular argument, it nonetheless shows that those considered more realist historically can be reevaluated. A case will be made concerning Alfred Mahan, that challenges the traditional realist historiography, placing Mahan principally as a follower of the resurgent *ideal* of Manifest Destiny, or as Anders Stephanson phrases it, a 'destinarian', advocating a 'realist' foreign policy strategy in pursuit of this particular ideal.⁶

¹ J. Tetsuro Sumida, *Inventing Grand Strategy And Teaching Command: The Classic Works Of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997, P. 2

² H. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 7th Edn, USA, McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2005, P.4

³ A. Mahan, *The Influence Of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783*, London, Dodo Press, 2008, P. I

⁴ J. Tetsuro Sumida, *Inventing Grand Strategy And Teaching Command: The Classic Works Of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997, P. 7

⁵ N. Ferguson, *Kissinger, 1923-1968: The Idealist*, London, Random House, 2015, P. 28

⁶ A. Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny*, New York, Hill And Wang, 1995, P. 79

Originally, Manifest Destiny referred to the natural right of the 'Anglo-Saxon' USA to spread westward and take control of the North American continent.⁷ This essay will link the issue of an inevitable, commercially and Christian driven, pre-ordained and exceptionalist expansion, with Mahan's superficially realist views coinciding with the resurgence of this ideal in U.S. foreign policy in *fin de siècle* America. This essay will aim to highlight this connection, and Mahan's adherence to this ideal as a destinarian, by examining numerous factors including: His emphasis on trade and commerce in the rationale of his work, linking it to the important commercial aspect of Manifest Destiny. His strong admiration and anglophilia displayed in his wish to emulate the United Kingdom and the 'anglo-saxon' race in his doctrine of naval expansion and correlating that with the focus on continuing the virtuous tradition of the 'anglo-saxon' race exhibited in Manifest Destiny. Furthermore it will look at the parallels between Mahan and Manifest Destiny's relationship with geography. And finally, corroborate Mahan's devout Protestantism and the sense of morality derived from it, with the Christian tradition of late nineteenth century Manifest Destiny. By examining these, the case will be made for considering Alfred Mahan, an idealist, viewed through the historiographical lens of Manifest Destiny.

As Sumida notes, Mahan recognised an important symbiotic relationship between commerce and a strong Navy, using knowledge drawn from the lessons he had learnt studying the Anglo-French wars.⁸ Mahan writing in the 1890s increasingly saw a world that was becoming more and more competitive between powerful nations that had the potential to threaten economic and territorial interests.⁹ This ostensibly shows that Mahan's conception of the relationship between commerce and the navy was one that was purely realist with the navy designed to protect economic interest. Mahan himself suggested,

“[an] attempt to blockade Boston, New York, the Delaware, the Chesapeake and the Mississippi, in other words, the great centres of export and import, would not entail upon one of the large maritime nations efforts greater than have been made before. England has

⁷ A. Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny*, New York, Hill And Wang, 1995, P. XI

⁸ J. Tetsuro Sumida, *Inventing Grand Strategy And Teaching Command: The Classic Works Of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997, P. 30

⁹ Ibid.

Ryanasuar

at the same blockaded Brest ... when there were more powerful squadrons lying in the harbours”.¹⁰

Superficially this seems to suggest that Mahan, was motivated primarily by the wish to protect American ports and repel a hypothetical blockade that had the potential to economically strangle America. Such interpretations classify Mahan’s conception of the need for a strong U.S. navy, as a primarily realist concern, however this interpretation of Mahan’s views on trade require an assumption that he viewed American trade in a very rational, almost scientific manner.

As Stephanson states, “commerce ... was after all supposed to be the outstanding civiliser”.¹¹ Commerce in the mind of destinarians played a vital role in the spreading of American civilisation and its providential vision. Mahan’s emphasis on the protection of commerce comes not from a pragmatic view of its importance to state power in a realist sense. But rather as practical way of ensuring the ‘soft power’ arteries of American Manifest Destiny, the great trading lanes of the sea, stayed open to achieve America’s inevitable ideological spread across the globe. We can see evidence of this in Mahan’s writings, quoting Republican statesman James Blaine in *The Interest Of America In Sea Power*, he suggests, “it is not an ambitious destiny for so great a country as ours to manufacture only what we can consume or produce only what we can eat”.¹² Mahan displayed high praise for this particular, destinarian, viewpoint, suggesting that it was vital for the United States’ welfare to ‘spread its commerce to all corners of the globe’.¹³ In Mahan’s eyes, trade would act as America’s *modus operandi* to realise its own uniqueness and exceptional situation poised between two great oceans and export its ideology across the world.¹⁴

It is important as well, to contextualise Mahan’s views within the political attitudes of the contemporary American political establishment. United States senator Albert Beveridge speaking in the aftermath of the Spanish-American war, suggested,

“We shall cover the oceans with our merchant marine. We shall build a navy to the measure of our greatness ... Our institutions will follow our flag on the wings of our commerce. And

¹⁰ A. Mahan, *The Influence Of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783*, London, Dodo Press, 2008, P. 51

¹¹ A. Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny*, New York, Hill And Wang, 1995, P. 94

¹² A. Mahan, *The Interest Of America In Sea Power*, Cambridge (USA), University Press, 1897, P. 5

¹³ Ibid. P. 6

¹⁴ Ibid.

Ryanasuar

American law, American order, American civilisation ... on shores hitherto bloody and benighted, but, by those agencies of God, henceforth to be made beautiful and bright".¹⁵

Indeed, Mahan's view of the outcomes of the Spanish American war were generally favourable.¹⁶ The time periods both before during and after the Spanish American War, heavily influenced those writing academically and shaping policy. When considering Mahan's thought processes then, it is important not to fall in to the trap of interpreting Mahan's ideas in a vacuum. Mahan was surely heavily influenced by the jingoistic and destinarian clamour for a new American mission after the closing of the frontier by the U.S. census bureau in 1890, with the Spanish American war providing that new mission for America.¹⁷ Mahan's emphasis on using the navy to protect trade and commerce both perpetuated and reflected the ideal of Manifest Destiny.¹⁸

Another important aspect of Mahan's philosophy is his anglophilia, this love and admiration for Great Britain had a profound impact on his works on naval strategy.¹⁹ Of course it is plausible to see Mahan's admiration for Britain and by extension its navy as a purely pragmatic and logical one, Great Britain's emphasis on naval strength set a perfect precedent for expressing a realist vision of state power.²⁰ However, it is important to note that one of the central tenets of the resurgent Manifest Destiny, was that the 'Anglo-Saxons', the inhabitants of the Anglosphere, were the superlative race with the strongest character, with America destined as its new leader in the twentieth century.²¹

Mahan perpetuates this ideal in his work perfectly. Mahan put great emphasis on the merits of 'national character' in explaining why certain countries in addition too, or even above, their geographical and material circumstances develop such strong navies and by extension, power bases. As Mahan explains with regards to Spain and its decline, "Spain's position and well situated ports, the fact that she was first to occupy large and rich portions of the new world ... she might have been

¹⁵ A. Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny*, New York, Hill And Wang, 1995, P. 99

¹⁶ J. Agnew, 'An Excess Of 'National Exceptionalism': Towards A New Political Geography Of American Foreign Policy, *Political Geography Quarterly*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1983, P. 152

¹⁷ D. Clark., 'Manifest Destiny And The Pacific', *Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1932, P. 12

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ D. Milne, *The Art And Science Of American Diplomacy*, New York, Farrar, Straus And Giroux, 2015, P. 33

²⁰ R. Seager, *Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man And His Letters*, Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 1977, P. 29

²¹ A. Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny*, New York, Hill And Wang, 1995, P. 80

Ryanasuar

expected to take the foremost place among the sea powers. Exactly the contrary was the result”.²²

Mahan blames this perceived failure of the Spanish and indeed the French, on a tendency to hoard and accumulate wealth at unsustainable rates, in contrast to the great trading and entrepreneurial nations of England and Holland.²³ For Mahan, national character was essential to building a strong state with liberty, commerce and by extension, naval strength.

The evidence for Mahan regarding a race with a strong national character, particularly the “Anglo-Saxon” as integral in achieving naval dominance, shows that it was a truly Destinarian ideal. For Mahan it was clear that the way in which America’s destiny should be manifested, was to pick up the mantle of the leading Anglo-Saxon nation from Great Britain. “[The British] were opening up backwards nations to trade, cleansing the arteries of global commerce ... as Great Britain lost strength, Mahan believed that the United States had to follow in its path, building a similarly dominant navy.”²⁴ This belief is a clear example of Mahan’s desintarian idealism, The Anglo-Saxon race and naval preeminence were an inseparable reality, America had to pick up the reigns from Great Britain. Naval buildup was not a realist-pragmatic position to increase America’s power but a necessity to perpetuate the ideal of the Anglo-Saxon continuing to exist as the world’s predominant race, in the vein of Manifest Destiny.

With regards to working with Great Britain, Mahan himself provides further evidence for his willingness to blend the Anglo-Saxon bond with notions of national self interest,

“Can anyone doubt that a cordial if unformulated, understanding between the two chief states of English tradition, to spread freely without mutual jealousy and in mutual support. Would increase greatly the world’s sum of happiness? But if a plea of the world’s welfare seem suspiciously like a cloak for the national self-interest, let the latter be accepted frankly as the adequate motive which it assuredly is.”²⁵

Mahan did not view international arbitration as a viable tool for foreign policy, a fact which shines through in this excerpt.²⁶ But what this extract displays is a view that the ‘realist’ idea of national

²² A. Mahan, *The Influence Of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783*, London, Dodo Press, 2008, P. 22

²³ Ibid. P. 24

²⁴ D. Milne, *The Art And Science Of American Diplomacy*, New York, Farrar, Straus And Giroux, 2015, P. 31

²⁵ A. Mahan, *The Interest Of America In Sea Power*, Cambridge (USA), University Press, 1897, P. 51

²⁶ D. Milne, *The Art And Science Of American Diplomacy*, New York, Farrar, Straus And Giroux, 2015, P. 22

Ryanasuar

self interest, very much blended with the destinarian ideal of spreading Anglo-Saxonism. In Mahan's mind, America's national self interest was the spread of the Anglo-Saxon race and simplistic accusations of Mahan as a wholehearted adherent to the doctrine of anarchic power politics, do take this into account. The strong navy precedent set by the British must not be viewed as a *realpolitik* example in state power for Mahan, but rather a racially idealistic expression of Anglo-Saxon virtue.

Geopolitics, or the impact geography has on international relations, is another strong influence on Mahan's work. On the face of it, this seems an inherently realist aspect of Mahan's writing, with geographical positioning being far more important to those advocating a *realpolitik* policy when compared to Wilsonian idealism for instance.²⁷ Nonetheless, the geographical determinism that Mahan writes on, does reflect a destinarian outlook, the idea of prefixed westerly trajectory for expansion is a central theme of Manifest Destiny. The Anglo-Saxon's of England spread westward in the 17th century and as the frontier expanded west in the 19th, it was America's destiny to expand into the Pacific in the 20th.²⁸ Indeed Mahan perpetuates this idea of westward expansion quite strongly in some of his writing, for instance he suggests,

“It would be impossible to exaggerate the momentous issues dependent upon the firm hold of the Sandwich Islands [Hawaii] by a great civilised, maritime power ... our own country, with its Pacific coast, is naturally indicated as the proper guardian for this most important position”.²⁹

It continues to look that, at least superficially, notions of idealism do not effect Mahan's foreign policy philosophy, and he is recognising Hawaii for its strategic value, which would of course be a perfect coaling station to refuel and resupply American ships. Mahan's phrasing however, is crucial and provides us with an insight into the contemporary American mentality.³⁰ In using the phrase 'naturally indicated' in reference to this important Pacific territory, Mahan reflects destinarian rhetoric of America's mission to geographically expand in a westward direction. Hawaii is

²⁷ W. Wilson, The Fourteen Points, www.lib.byu.edu/index.php/President_Wilson's_Fourteen_Points, 8/1/1919, Date Accessed: 25/2/2016

²⁸ A. Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny*, New York, Hill And Wang, 1995, P. 18

²⁹ A. Mahan, *The Interest Of America In Sea Power*, Cambridge (USA), University Press, 1897, P. 32

³⁰ A. Brinkley, *The Unfinished Nation*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 2010, P. 499

Ryanasuar

strategically important, yes, but as a strategically important staging post for the spatial expansion of the destinarian ideal.

As Stephanson notes the territories acquired in the Pacific theatre of the Spanish American War, the Philippines, made “Hawaii look even more like a providentially designed halfway station in the middle of the Pacific ... the Philippines had in fact been thrust into American hands to complete the series of stepping stones into Asia.”³¹ Indeed it was Mahan’s belief that the USA had a divinely commissioned responsibility in China, the ancient empire, to reinvigorate their decaying society with American Christianising glory.³² So, in true destinarian fashion, it was Mahan’s view, that the acquisition of new western territories was mutually beneficial for the world and America.³³ Mahan believed in the providential prerogative of America to expand, as he suggested, “our youth carried our boundary to the Gulf of Mexico; today maturity sees us upon the pacific. Have we no right or call to progress further in any direction?”³⁴

Mahan’s attention to geography appears to amount to an amoral, methodical strategy on the face of it, but it actually more closely reflects a kind of ‘geo-idealism’. As the geography of America influenced the ideal of Manifest Destiny, so too it influenced Mahan’s views on geo-strategy, Mahan’s aforementioned anglophilia and calls for cordial understanding within the Anglo-Saxon race, shows that the Eastern side of the Atlantic was friendly in Mahan’s world view.³⁵ Thus, Mahan wanted to create a global military strategy that put the U.S. navy into to forefront of tactical thinking, as he viewed it as the best method to carry America’s destinarian mission westward to at the turn of the 20th century.

The argument can also be made that less obvious aspects of Mahan’s views on geopolitics relating to westward expansion still fit in with this way of viewing Mahan’s writing. Mahan throughout his works for instance made it imperatively clear that a trans-isthmian canal to the *south* of the USA in Central America must be constructed.³⁶ Mahan considered the Canal as a means of transit to ensure

³¹ A. Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny*, New York, Hill And Wang, 1995, P. 92

³² W. Livezey, *Mahan On Sea Power*, Oklahoma, University Of Oklahoma Press, 1947, P. 23

³³ D. Milne, *The Art And Science Of American Diplomacy*, New York, Farrar, Straus And Giroux, 2015, P. 61

³⁴ A. Mahan, *The Interest Of America In Sea Power*, Cambridge (USA), University Press, 1897, P. 35

³⁵ A. Mahan, ‘The Panama Canal And The Distribution Of The Fleet’, *The North American Review*, Vol. 200, No. 706, 1914, P. 412

³⁶ D. Milne, *The Art And Science Of American Diplomacy*, New York, Farrar, Straus And Giroux, 2015, P. 65

Ryanasuar

that the American navy could respond to threats at full force without having to dilute the strength of the U.S. fleet, seemingly not taking into account any notions of geographical idealism. Mahan however theorised that “men have not yet adjusted their thought to the new condition, that the Pacific rather than the Atlantic holds the problem of the near future”.³⁷ In Mahan’s eyes it was the *westerly* Pacific ocean that held the fate for America’s destiny, but he had to advocate a realist foreign policy in order to link his idealist plans for naval projection, by pragmatically ensuring that the shipping-industrial capacity and large population of the East Coast were linked to the Pacific via the Panama Canal. That is why Mahan advocated so strongly for such a link because he knew it was a vital and tangible geo-strategic artery that was necessary to pursue his geo-idealistic and destinarian vision for U.S. foreign policy.

The final aspect of Mahan’s character to be examined is his Protestantism, as well as the sense of morality that he derived from his religious beliefs. As William Livezey suggests, although some scholars have discounted Mahan’s forthright Protestant beliefs as antithetical to his supposed realist views, Alfred Mahan, did not think in such a fashion.³⁸ Therefore, taking into account Mahan’s strong Protestant convictions is essential in understanding his foreign policy philosophy.³⁹ In many ways it could be argued that Mahan’s Protestant principles drove some of his other views discussed in this essay. For instance, the idea of a ‘Protestant ethic’, is evident in much of Mahan’s work, commerce and the national character inherent to the Anglo-Saxon race, were synonymous with Protestant virtues.⁴⁰ Mahan for instance thought that the ideal naval power would be infused with such a Protestant ethic, an emulation of Great Britain, but with the addition of a much larger population.⁴¹

It is particularly important for the argument of portraying Mahan as a destinarian, to highlight the discernible link between Manifest Destiny and Protestantism. Protestantism was inextricably tied to American notions of liberty that emerged from the English enlightenment giving it, as a religion, a special place in the destinarian ideals of the White Anglo-Saxon Protestant elite, of which Mahan

³⁷ A. Mahan, ‘The Panama Canal And The Distribution Of The Fleet’, *The North American Review*, Vol. 200, No. 706, 1914, P. 412

³⁸ W. Livezey, *Mahan On Sea Power*, Oklahoma, University Of Oklahoma Press, 1947, P. 22

³⁹ D. Milne, *The Art And Science Of American Diplomacy*, New York, Farrar, Straus And Giroux, 2015, P. 29

⁴⁰ A. Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny*, New York, Hill And Wang, 1995, P. 80

⁴¹ D. Milne, *The Art And Science Of American Diplomacy*, New York, Farrar, Straus And Giroux, 2015, P. 41

Ryanasuar

belonged to.⁴² This idea of the wish to spread Protestantism is a naturally idealistic motive, Mahan was incredibly supportive of foreign missionary work and it no doubt played a part in his foreign policy aspirations.⁴³ What better way to secure the expansion of the Protestant faith than so safeguard the passage of the faith along the great highway of the sea.

Despite this, the impact of his Protestant faith, Mahan has been accused of a lack of morality in his foreign policy because of the seemingly scientific approach to his foreign policy making.⁴⁴ Arguably this is wrong on two fronts, firstly his destinarian vision came with a condition that the spread of missionaries and the Protestant faith came with a kind of “providential guidance” and that God had bestowed upon the USA, the task as his chosen people to carry out the Christian mission for the peoples of Asia.⁴⁵ Secondly his Christianity influenced the way in which he believed naval commanders should actually behave at sea. Mahan viewed the acceptance of the Christian faith as moral test and likened the belief in faith as acting upon imperfect information similarly to how commanders would have to at sea.⁴⁶ In regards to behaviour at sea, Mahan did not explicitly feel that Christianity was a moral guide in itself, like he did in his wider ideology, but that faith itself improved the effectiveness and integrity of a naval commander.⁴⁷ This shows that even in parts of Mahan’s work that may not be assumed to be an indicator of his idealism, such as his individual tactical instruction, he was still influenced by his personal religious beliefs that helped to shape even his most systematic and rigid writing.

Anders Stephanson eloquently summaries that, “Captain Alfred Mahan provided the emergent navalism with ideological foundation, a destinarian vision of American geopolitics of the seas.”⁴⁸ Alfred Mahan pursued the realist strategy of expanding the U.S. navy as he felt it was the most effective way of securing America’s Manifest Destiny in the twentieth century.

Multiple aspects of Mahan’s foreign policy views correlate with contemporary attitudes and destinarian thought within the U.S. political establishment that indicate Mahan was an adherent of

⁴² A. Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny*, New York, Hill And Wang, 1995, P. xiii

⁴³ W. Livezey, *Mahan On Sea Power*, Oklahoma, University Of Oklahoma Press, 1947, P. 21

⁴⁴ Ibid. P. 22

⁴⁵ Ibid. P. 24

⁴⁶ J. Tetsuro Sumida, *Inventing Grand Strategy And Teaching Command: The Classic Works Of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997, P. 77

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ A. Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny*, New York, Hill And Wang, 1995, P. 79

Ryanasuar

this ideal. His views on external commerce resonated with the aspect of contemporary thinking that emphasised commerce as means of furthering the American mission to foreign shores, the navy would be the instrument that would secure that. His views on race and national characteristic clearly ran parallel with many destinarian thinkers, holding the 'Anglo-Saxon' in such high esteem and advocated that race's virtue, a strong navy was vital and came naturally to the success of the Anglo-Saxon race. Even geography influenced Mahan's writings, although interested in geo-strategy, his emphasis on the importance of geography in regards to the U.S. was geared towards furthering the westerly spread of American destiny. Mahan's views were rounded off by his devout Protestantism rooted in the lore of the original puritan mission, implanting a sense of morality and guidance into his work that reflected the providential direction of Manifest Destiny.

These combination of factors display the complexity of Alfred Mahan, he should not be viewed in an abstract vacuum and as a result categorised simply, as a realist. Instead, by placing Mahan's work in climatic context and analysed through the historiographical lens of Manifest Destiny, it can be seen that Alfred Thayer Mahan was idealistic in nature, using realist strategy to pursue his ideal.

Bibliography

Agnew, J., 'An Excess Of 'National Exceptionalism': Towards A New Political Geography Of American Foreign Policy, *Political Geography Quarterly*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1983, pp. 151-166

Brinkley, A., *The Unfinished Nation*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 2010

Clark, D., 'Manifest Destiny And The Pacific', *Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1932, pp. 1-17

Ferguson, N., *Kissinger, 1923-1968: The Idealist*, London, Random House, 2015

Livezey, W., *Mahan On Sea Power*, Oklahoma, University Of Oklahoma Press, 1947

Mahan, A., *The Influence Of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783*, London, Dodo Press, 2008

Mahan, A., *The Interest Of America In Sea Power*, Cambridge (USA), University Press, 1897

Mahan, A., 'The Panama Canal And The Distribution Of The Fleet', *The North American Review*, Vol. 200, No. 706, 1914, pp. 406-417

Milne, D., *The Art And Science Of American Diplomacy*, New York, Farrar, Straus And Giroux, 2015

Morgenthau, H., *Politics Among Nations*, 7th Edn, USA, McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2005

Seager, R., *Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man And His Letters*, Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 1977

Stephanson, A., *Manifest Destiny*, New York, Hill And Wang, 1995

Tetsuro Sumida, J., *Inventing Grand Strategy And Teaching Command: The Classic Works Of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997

Wilson, W., The Fourteen Points, www.lib.byu.edu/index.php/President_Wilson's_Fourteen_Points, 8/1/1919, Date Accessed: 25/2/2016